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Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Jeff is the co-founder and COO of Phase Two, and has been actively contributing to Keycloak and its open-source extension ecosystem for many years. Prior to Phase Two, he built a successful career as an engineering director at a major CDN.

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Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938): What Keycloak Operators Need to Do

· 7 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Bottom line: if you run Keycloak on x86-64 servers with recent Intel or AMD CPUs, add -XX:-UseBASE64Intrinsics to the JVM today, then move to a patched Java runtime. Java4Shell (CVE-2026-114938), disclosed on November 17, 2026, is a memory-corruption bug in OpenJDK's Base64 decoder, and Keycloak is the first application on the researchers' list of products where they demonstrated remote code execution without authentication, in a default configuration. ARM64 is not affected, which is why Phase Two hosted clusters were never exposed.

Update, November 19, 2026: Red Hat has shipped the patched OpenJDK, the official Keycloak 26.8 images have been refreshed, and every image Phase Two publishes is now on the fixed JDK (21.0.13.1). The tags are listed under the permanent fix.

Native login for Keycloak: sign users in with your app's own screens on iOS and Android

· 6 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Today we're opening up native authentication for Keycloak: a set of Keycloak extensions and iOS and Android SDKs that let a mobile app sign users in with its own screens instead of a browser. Passwords, passkeys, TOTP, email and SMS codes, recovery codes, push approvals with number matching, step-up and required actions all run natively, while Keycloak still decides what the user has to do. The SDKs are Apache 2.0, and the code is on GitHub.

Login Tracer: debug SAML and OIDC logins in Chrome DevTools

· 6 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Today we're releasing Login Tracer by Phase Two, a free Chrome DevTools extension for debugging SAML and OpenID Connect / OAuth logins. Open DevTools, select the Login Tracer panel, and log in: every SSO request in the tab is decoded, grouped into a login flow, and checked for common misconfigurations, with explanations of the Keycloak setting most likely behind each problem. It requests no permissions and makes no network requests.

The CLOUD Act and your identity provider

· 17 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

The CLOUD Act does not hand anyone a key to a European data centre. It does something narrower, and for an identity provider more awkward than the usual telling. 18 U.S.C. § 2713 makes the location of data irrelevant to whether a provider under US jurisdiction has to produce it, and the process that reaches most of what an identity provider holds is the cheapest instrument in the Stored Communications Act: a subpoena for subscriber records, no warrant, no judicial finding, and no obligation to tell the customer. Below is what the statute says, which level of process reaches which table in a Keycloak realm (tested on 26.8.1), why the defence the CLOUD Act added does not cover an EU customer's identity data on either of its two conditions, and what a vendor with a US parent can honestly promise. Including us.

Porting Azure AD B2C custom policies to Keycloak

· 15 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Most of an Azure AD B2C custom policy maps onto Keycloak configuration rather than code. A user journey becomes an authentication flow, orchestration steps become executions, preconditions become conditional subflows, the claims schema becomes the declarative user profile, and page layouts become themes. None of that is Java.

Three things are not configuration. RESTful technical profiles called mid-journey become a custom Authenticator. Long claims-transformation chains become either several protocol mappers or one script mapper — and the script mapper is a JAR you build, not JavaScript you paste into the console, which surprises people. And orchestration that branches on a computed value rather than on the presence of a claim has no declarative equivalent at all.

Everything below was run against Keycloak 26.8.1 in start-dev. The Java compiles against 26.8.1; every HTTP status and response body is copied from an actual run.

Keycloak slow migration vs fast migration: moving your users

· 11 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

A slow migration moves users from a legacy system into Keycloak one at a time, as each of them logs in. It goes by other names too: lazy migration, just-in-time (JIT) migration, trickle migration. Nobody gets a password reset email, there is no cutover weekend, and users who never come back are never migrated.

The other side is a fast migration: a bulk import that moves every user into Keycloak at once, before or at cutover. It is quicker to finish and easier to reason about, but it needs something a slow migration doesn't, usually the users' password hashes.

Keycloak doesn't ship slow migration. You add it with a user storage provider, and the one almost everyone uses is open source on GitHub: daniel-frak/keycloak-user-migration. This post covers how slow and fast migrations work, where the code lives, how to choose, and how to combine the two so a slow migration doesn't drag on for months.

Slow migrationFast migration
When users moveOne at a time, at their next loginAll at once, at import
Password hashes neededNo, the legacy system checks passwordsYes, or users set a new password
Legacy system after cutoverMust stay up and answer the migration endpointsCan be turned off
Dormant usersNever migrated unless you add a final stepMigrated with everyone else
Time to finishWeeks to months, plus a long tailHours to days

Passkeys make login faster. Here is the data, and how to roll them out in Keycloak

· 12 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Every second a customer spends on your login page is a second they might spend somewhere else. Typing an email and password, mistyping it, waiting for a code, switching to an authenticator app, or giving up and resetting the password are all time between someone deciding to sign in and actually getting in. Passkeys remove most of those steps, and every large published measurement shows the same result: sign-in with a passkey takes about half the time, or less, and fails far less often. Our own customers report the same: after introducing passkeys, they measured login times drop by several seconds per sign-in.

This post collects the published figures, explains where the time goes, and shows how to introduce passkeys in Keycloak alongside the password login you already have.

Replacing homegrown e-commerce login with Keycloak

· 11 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

The login page is the most attacked page on an online store, and it is rarely the one anyone designed for attack. Homegrown e-commerce login usually starts as a users table, a bcrypt column and a session cookie, and it grows a password reset, a mobile API, a trade-account flag and a social button over the years. What it almost never grows is a defense against credential stuffing: automated replay of email and password pairs leaked from other sites, aimed at whichever of your customers reused one. Replacing homegrown login with Keycloak gives a store one identity service for web, app and back office, with social login, B2B accounts and branded pages built in, and you can move customers onto it without asking anyone to reset a password. It does not make the login page safe on its own. The defaults leave doors open that attackers look for first, and the rest of this post covers both halves: what you gain, and what has to be layered on top.

"Restart login cookie not found" in Keycloak

· 9 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

"Restart login cookie not found. It may have expired; it may have been deleted or cookies are disabled in your browser." Keycloak shows this on a dead-end HTTP 400 page, and the message is more confident than it should be. It means exactly one thing: the request arrived with no KC_RESTART cookie at all. Not a stale one, not a rejected one. None. That cookie has no expiry to run out, so "it may have expired" is the one explanation that is never true. A rejected cookie produces a different message. And the page tells the user to "Click Back to Application", which on a default client renders no link to click.

Here is what the cookie is for, how to tell in one log line which failure you have, and the one client field that turns the dead end into a recoverable page.

Where your Keycloak data lives: Frankfurt, Ireland, and what leaves the EU

· 8 min read
Jeff Patzer
Phase Two

Here is where your Keycloak data lives with us. The Keycloak database, sessions, event store, backups and realm signing keys for an EU cluster run in AWS Frankfurt (eu-central-1), with backups in Ireland (eu-west-1), and are never replicated outside the EU. Three things of ours do run in the United States: the dashboard you sign in to, support tickets, and billing. You contract with Phase Two, Inc., which is incorporated in the United States, and our control plane runs there, so administrators outside the EU can reach your cluster in order to operate it. Under Chapter V of the GDPR that access is a restricted transfer, and we would rather write it down here than have you find it in a risk assessment.